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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
FOREWORD
CLOTHED WITH INTEGRITY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
ATTORNEY DISLOYALTY IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
K. K. HALL*
INTRODUCTION

just.

If everyone were clothed with integrity, if every heart were
. .the other virtues would be well-nigh useless. . .. "I

What are the essential attributes of an attorney? What determines
whether a lawyer is functioning properly within the bounds of an adversary
system? These are obviously broad questions that are not susceptible to
simple answers. Yet, the practitioners of a profession bound by standards of
ethical behavior must always hold these inquiries open. As a principal
component in an organized attempt to achieve justice in the resolution of
conflict, attorneys must always remember that their personal adherence to
the standards of the legal profession may have consequences that extend far
beyond an individual career.
The essential formulation of an attorney's ethical standards is contained
in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code). The Code suggests that an attorney must embody two qualities:
competence and integrity. 2 The remaining portions of the Code are largely
efforts to amplify and explain these fundamental concepts. It must be
remembered that the Code is more than a basis for individual discipline. It
also provides an intellectual foundation from which the court can exercise a
"non-delegable responsibility to insure that nothing, not even the appearance
of impropriety, is permitted to tarnish the judicial process or 3 shake the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the legal profession.''
A social system that aims at resolving conflicts that are often bitter in
nature must have the confidence of those it serves if its determinations are
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. I gratefully
acknowledge the editorial assistance of my law clerk, Michael L. Keller, J.D. West Virginia
University, 1985, in the preparation of this article.
1. Moliere, Le Misanthrope, Act V, Scene 1.
2. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 1 (1979).
3. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 919-20 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, sub nom,
Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-1379 (June 17, 1982).
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to be accepted. When a court inquires into the nature of an attorney's
performance, it is, therefore, acting to preserve the essence of the legal
system. In civil actions the operation of this duty may be reflected in
disqualification proceedings against single attorneys or entire firms with
potentially profound effects on the outcome of litigation. In the operation
of criminal law the gravity of the court's duty is increased by the additional
concerns of specific constitutional guarantees. The failure of a criminal
defendant's counsel to meet the standards of the legal profession has
profound constitutional significance which must always be of concern to the
court.
It is the purpose of this article to briefly examine the judicial position
in this circuit on the importance of attorney integrity. More specifically, the
focus will be on integrity as it is exhibited within the framework of an
attorney's loyalty to a client. 4 It is hoped that this inquiry will raise more
questions than it answers and that by stimulating discussion on the proper
evaluation of loyalty, readers will be encouraged to re-examine their own
commitment to ethical behavior.
It should be noted at the outset that when this article speaks of disloyalty,
it is not addressing intentional betrayal, for an attorney may be disloyal
without intent. Rather, we are examining a form of constructive disloyalty,
a condition implied by law when an attorney's fidelity to a present or former
client somehow appears objectively deficient. It may be argued that disloyalty
in this sense is an elaborate fiction. It is this author's position, however,
that within this circuit the consequences of disloyalty, real or constructive,
are extensive and concrete.
I.
If integrity as revealed in the context of loyalty is the central theme of
this article, some preliminary consideration must be given to the other major
quality of an attorney-competence. Although both are fundamental to an
ethical attorney, competence is measured from a substantially different
perspective than is integrity.
In many ways competence may be the easier concept to grasp as well as
the easier to measure. The United States Supreme Court has provided
substantial guidance concerning attorney competence in its cases analyzing
the sixth amendment right to effective counsel. The Court noted in Powell
v. Alabama,6 that competence consists of such skill and knowledge as will
render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. In Strickland v. Wash-

4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067 (1984). "[TJhe duty
of loyalty [is] perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover it is difficult to measure
the precise effect . . . of representation corrupted by conflicting interests." Id.
5. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9 (1979). Canon 9 addresses the
possibility that appearances alone can constitute impropriety. Id. Ethical Consideration 9-2
notes that even "ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical." Id.
6. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ington,7 the Court stated that counsel's performance was within the range
of acceptability as long as errors did not create a reasonable probability that
the result of the judicial proceeding would be different.
As Powell and Strickland clearly demonstrate, competence is primarily
linked to reliable factfinding. An analysis of competence operates with an
internal focus that looks inward at the legal profession. A determination
that an attorney has acted competently is made by measuring that attorney's
level of performance against that of some other reasonably effective counsel.
In the strictest sense, the expectations of the client are not relevant to a
measure of competence.
II.
In contrast, the absence of practitioner integrity is a fatal flaw in the
judicial system that merits concern even when the factfinding is unimpaired.
The Code of Professional Responsibility's Canon 9 command that an attorney avoid even "the appearance of impropriety" recognizes that the adversarial system operates effectively only when clients can have full and complete
confidence in their counsel. Not surprisingly, therefore, integrity is examined
from an external perspective that considers the reasonable expectations of
the public. Inquiry focuses not on whether another reasonable attorney
would find actions to be lacking in integrity or, as this article is approaching
the question, disloyal. Rather, the evaluation looks to the position of the
reasonably objective layperson. 8
Loyalty is demonstrated primarily in an unswerving commitment of an
attorney to the interests of his client within the ethical limits otherwise stated
in the Code. 9 A question of potential disloyalty is presented whenever the
attorney's commitment is divided or diluted. There are essentially two
conditions that place loyalty at risk: (1) joint representation of more than
one client in a single proceeding and (2) successive representation where an
attorney acts in opposition to a former client.
The problems attending joint representation have been examined by the
Supreme Court in the context of criminal trials.' 0 The Court has stated that
when multiple or joint representation creates a conflict of interest that
adversely affects a lawyer's performance, an impermissible violation of the
sixth amendment occurs." Although this analysis seems to focus on the
internal factfinding process for sixth amendment purposes, there is also
strong implication that if a court clearly determines that a client is not
prejudiced by joint representation, no reasonable layperson would find the

7. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 653 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1981).
9. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1979) (recognizing that zealous
representation of a client must remain within the bounds of law).
10. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
11. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350.
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attorney's actions improper. The inquiry into loyalty, therefore, remains
external.
The implications of successive representation have received less definitive
judicial treatment. In many ways the dilemma presented by successive
representation is more complex. In a fluid and mobile society, busy attorneys
may well find themselves acting in opposition to former clients. Despite some
concern with the "treachery of changing sides"' 2 it is reasonably clear that
merely opposing a party who has once been a client is not in itself impermissible disloyalty. It is the subject matter of the two representations that
controls the inquiry. Since the law presumes that an attorney possesses all
of the confidential information to which he had access in the representation
of a client, 3 any substantial similarity4 in the affairs being litigated raises the
specter of a violation of confidence.'
In addition to examining the nature of the representation to determine
if the successive representation involves substantially similar issues, some
courts have considered other issues in a balancing process as a means of
deciding if disloyalty is present. The Fifth Circuit, for example, concluded
that Canon 9 "impropriety" should not be determined inflexibly. The court
in Woods v. Covington County Bank,' 5 stated that a "client's right to
counsel of his choice, the lawyer's right freely to practice his profession"
and in the case of former government attorneys, "the government's need to
attract skilled lawyers"' 6 all had to be weighed before finding that an attorney
had exhibited disloyalty by changing sides.
The Fourth Circuit has not rejected a balancing analysis as a mechanism
for determining impropriety. It is, however, the position of this article that
this circuit, in its most recent efforts to grapple with the issue, has exhibited
a practice of strictly applying the principles embodied in Canon 9. In the
Fourth Circuit, the need for integrity arguably carries the greatest weight.
III.
The issue of loyalty in the civil context was before the Fourth Circuit in
the appeal of the district court decision of In Re Asbestos Cases.17 The
dispute in that case arose from a motion to disqualify attorney Neil R.
Peterson and his employer, the law firm of Greitzer & Locks, from participation in a body of asbestos litigation known as the "Norfolk Cases."' 8
Peterson had been employed by the Department of Justice as a Special
Litigation Counsel before entering private practice with Greitzer & Locks in

12. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975).
13. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
14. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 4 (1979). EC 4-1 recognizes the
paramount importance of confidentiality to the proper functioning of the legal system. Id.
15. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
16. Id. at 812.
17. Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-1379 (June 17, 1982).
18. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 917.
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1980. His duties as Special Counsel had involved the general coordination
of the defense of asbestos litigation against the United States and specifically
the "Norfolk Cases."' 9 Since Greitzer & Locks also was involved extensively
in asbestos litigation generally and the "Norfolk Cases" in particular, the
firm sought a waiver of any imputed disqualification that might flow from
an application of the Ethics in Government Act.20 After insisting on a rigid
screening procedure that barred Peterson's participation not only in the
"Norfolk Cases," but also in any asbestos litigation in which the United
States was a party, the Justice Department waived disqualification of the
2
firm. '
In ruling on a subsequent motion to disqualify the firm, the district
court declined to accept the Government's waiver as dispositive of the issue.
The court concluded that its independent duty to safeguard the integrity of
the judicial process required that it reconsider any disqualification questions
in light of Canon 9. Regardless of whether any independent statutory
limitations had been satisfied, the Code of Professional Responsibility could
not be allowed to sink into the realm of "reverberating generalities. '" 22
Although the district court recognized that other societal interests, including the right to counsel of choice, were invoked in a disqualification
controversy, it clearly found that these interests could not outweigh a
reasonable public perception of disloyalty. Once its analysis of the screening
procedure determined that the "lay public cannot be expected to perceive
the screening [of Peterson] to be effective,"23 the court found that disqualification of Greitzer & Locks was mandated.
This strict application of Canon 9 was considered by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals sitting en banc. The judgment of the district court was
affirmed by an equally divided court. Although the mechanism seems somewhat equivocal, this circuit impliedly accepted a position that Canon 9 has
sharp teeth. Attorneys intrude upon the ethical standards Canon 9 sets at
substantial risk to themselves and their employers.
IV.
Attorney Peterson's experience in In Re Asbestos Cases demonstrated
the consequences of allowing even constructive disloyalty to reach the level
of perceived impropriety in civil matters. Similar conduct in criminal proCircuit recently
ceedings may have even more dramatic results. The Fourth
24
considered such a situation in United States v. Schell.
19. Id.

20. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1980).
21. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 919.
22. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 920 (quoting Empire Linotype School v. United
States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
23. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 925. "[Tjhe right of the public to retain counsel
of its choice is secondary in importance to the Court's duty to maintain the highest standards
of professional conduct to insure and preserve trust in the integrity of the bar." Id.
24. United States v. Schell, 775 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1985).
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In Schell, a private attorney, David Jividen, was contacted by two
individuals, John B. Cain and Freda G. Wilson, who had been subpoenaed
as part of a grand jury investigation of a sizeable drug organization in
northern West Virginia. Jividen's representation of the two was apparently
limited to telephoning the United States Attorney's Office on behalf of Cain
and to advising Wilson in preparation for her appearance before the grand
25
jury.
Four months later, Jividen was employed as an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Northern District of West Virginia. In that capacity, he
was involved in the preparation of Government cases against what was
known as the Gallo drug organization. Among those ultimately indicted and
tried on a variety of drug-related charges were Cain, Wilson and thirty-seven
other defendants.
Following their convictions of numerous crimes including violations of
the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et
seq., Cain and Wilson appealed, contending that Jividen's involvement in
the case violated their right to a fair trial. The Government argued that there
had been no actual conflict of interest, impropriety or appearance of
impropriety attendant to Jividen's participation. The Government contended
that Jividen had been insulated completely from the portion of the prosecution involving Cain and Wilson. The Government further maintained that
6
Jividen never obtained any confidential information from either defendant.1
Whatever merit the Government's position might have had in another
context, this circuit totally rejected its application to a case in which the
criminal defendant's attorney had changed sides. In criminal proceedings, a
client's right to a loyal attorney is protected not only by Canon 9, but also
by the requirements of fundamental fairness embodied in the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 27 That additional protection
requires that an examination of loyalty move beyond the perspective of the
reasonable layperson and consider whether there is any potential for an
impairment of the attorney-client relationship.
As the Fourth Circuit in Schell stated:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is a sacred one.
In that relationship, the client must be secure in the knowledge that
any information he reveals to counsel will remain confidential. The
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship is severely compromised, if not destroyed, when, after representing a client, a lawyer
joins in the criminal prosecution of that client with respect to the
identical matter about which the attorney originally counseled the
client. Such switching of sides is fundamentally unfair and inherently
28
prejudical.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 562.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
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The loyalty of an attorney is obviously far more than a personal virtue. It
is an indispensable ingredient in a "sacred relationship" as well as a
29
fundamental right of a criminal defendant.
CONCLUSION

It should not be assumed that either Schell or In Re Asbestos Cases are
the ultimate or definitive words on the issue of attorney loyalty in this
circuit. Certainly it may be argued that the strict position taken by the courts
in each is attributable in part to the involvement of present or past government attorneys. There is obviously an additional concern for public responsibility in such situations. 0 Nevertheless, this circuit has twice exhibited an
unmistakable willingness to hold attorneys to the highest standards of their
profession and to exact a high price for failure to meet those standards. The
clothes of integrity are in fashion in the Fourth Circuit.

29. Id.
30. Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9 (1979). In addition to statutory
limitations such as the Ethics in Government Act, and the general ethical standards set in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the former government attorney is subject to the specific
constraints set forth in EC 9-3 and DR 9-101(B). Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1980).

